[Vol. 85 clearly established, courts have differed on whether a well-pleaded complaint based upon malicious prosecution by a government official "acting under color of law" provides a cause of action under § 1983.18
The debate entails not only whether malicious prosecution itself violates the federal Constitution, but also what particular provision the tort violates. 14 The federal courts have split almost evenly on the issue of whether a plaintiff must allege more than the common law tort of malicious prosecution to state a claim under § 1983.
Allegation of Malicious Prosecution Violates the Constitution: The Expansive Approach
The most liberal approach taken with respect to an allegation of malicious prosecution under § 1983 has been clearly articulated by the Third Circuit, which held that an allegation of the elements of the common law tort, by itself, states a claim under § 1983 for violation of a constitutional right. 1 5 In Lee v. Mihalich,' 6 plaintiffs brought an action against investigators in the Medicaid Fraud Control Office Unit of the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General alleging abuse of process and malicious prosecution against them pursuant to a Medicaid fraud suit that was dismissed as time-barred.' 7 While the court held that the defendants were entitled to a defense based upon qualified immunity,' 8 the court determined that a successful allegation of 13 Indeed, some circuits have reversed their own decisions as to whether malicious prosecution can provide a basis for relief under § 1983. See Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1180-81 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2323 Ct. (1992 (noting that the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have "flip-flopped" on the constitutional tort status of malicious prosecution).
14 Of course, the debate over the particular constitutional provision violated is only an issue for those circuit courts that hold that malicious prosecution, by itself, violates a provision of the Constitution. [t] here is a federal right to be free from malicious prosecutions"); Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that abuse of process, of which malicious prosecution is a subset, by definition denies an individual procedural due process); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961 n.5 (2d Cir. 1988) ("There can be no question that malicious prosecution can form the basis for imposition of liability under section 1983."). 16 Similarly, other circuits have applied the Lee rationale to an allegation of malicious prosecution against a sheriff and investigating officer pursuant to a grand larceny arrest; 2 1 an allegation against police officers pursuant to a vacated narcotics conviction; 2 2 an allegation against prosecuting attorneys pursuant to an unpaid bank loan; 23 and an allegation against an investigator in the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama pursuant to a forgery indictment.
2 4 The expansion of the rationale into these areas indicates that the only requirement for bringing a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 is an allegation of "action under color of law."2
Malicious Prosecution, Without More, Does Not Violate the Constitution: The "Malicious Prosecution Plus" Approach
Other circuit courts of appeals, however, have held that an allegation of common law malicious prosecution does not violate a provision of the Constitution unless it is "'intended to subject a person to denial of constitutional rights.'" 28 These courts recognize that malian "objective reasonableness" standard to be applied to each claim. Id cious prosecution may be part of a cognizable § 1983 claim, but "only if the defendants' conduct also infringes some provision of the Constitution or federal law." 27 Therefore, their decisions require a plaintiff to allege not only malicious prosecution, but also that the abuse of the legal process was "so egregious as to subject the aggrieved individual to a deprivation of constitutional dimension." 2 8
In Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 29 the First Circuit, after recognizing the split among the other circuits, 3 0 adopted the standard that to establish liability in a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the defendant "subject[ed] the plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude." 3 1 Specifically, the court held that a complaint based on malicious prosecution must allege a violation of procedural or substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 32 Applying this standard, the court found that the plaintiffs claim 33 "show[ed] neither 'conscience-shocking' conduct nor met the requisites of a procedural due process claim." 34 Nevertheless, by analyzing petitioner's claim under a Fourteenth Amendment rubric, the First Circuit recognized that, at some level, a complaint based upon malicious prosecution may violate § 1983. 35 Similarly, applying the standard that a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution must allege a specific constitutional violation, the Ninth Circuit held that a complaint alleging "that the defendants illegally arrested [the plaintiff], submitted false reports and initiated his criminal prosecution in bad faith" successfully stated a cause of action under § 1983 because the defendants "intended to deprive a 
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protection if she would act as an informant against narcotics dealers in the Macomb area. 53 Specifically, under the agreement with the police, Moore would first identify potential narcotics dealers without direction from Detective Oliver and then purchase narcotics from those dealers with money provided to her from the Macomb Police Department through Detective Oliver. 54 In addition, Detective Oliver paid Moore between fifty and seventy-five dollars for each purchase of a controlled substance that she reported.
5 5
-Throughout the spring and summer of 1987, Moore represented to Detective Oliver that she had purchased controlled substances pursuant to this arrangement from over fifty separate individuals. 56 On 17July 1987, Moore delivered a substance that appeared to be cocaine to Detective Oliver and reported that she had purchased the substance from John Albright,Jr. in a room at the Pace Hotel in Macomb, Illinois. 5 7 Detective Oliver submitted the substance to the police laboratory for testing. 58 On 2 September 1987, the laboratory concluded that the substance was actually baking powder. Detective Oliver went to the home of John Albright, Jr. on 28 September 1987 to execute the arrest warrant. 6 2 After being informed by Mr. Albright's wife that her husband was a sixty-year-old retired registered pharmacist, 63 and that they had two sons named Kevin and John David Albright, 64 Detective Oliver realized that Mr. Albright may not be the person from whom Moore had allegedly purchased the "look-alike substance." Kevin Albright surrendered to Detective Oliver on 19 October 1987, but denied any involvement in the alleged crime. 74 Detective Oliver arrested Kevin Albright and the judge set bond at $3500. 75 Mr. Albright paid the ten percent bond ($350) required by Illinois law and was released. 7 6 As a condition of his bond, Kevin Albright was prohibited from leaving the state of Illinois without leave of court. On 5 January 1988, Detective Oliver testified at a preliminary hearing that Kevin Albright sold the "look-alike substance" to Moore on 17July 1987.78 At this hearing, Detective Oliver failed to advise the court of various circumstances surrounding Kevin Albright's arrest, including: Moore's prior history; Detective Oliver's previous testimony to the Grand Jury; and the various arrest warrants issued pursuant to the alleged July 17 sale. 79 Regardless of this failure, the court found On 27 June 1988, the court dismissed the criminal action on the basis that it did not state an offense under Illinois law. 81 Almost two years to the day after the dismissal of the charges against Kevin Albright, he filed a claim in federal district court against Detective Oliver and the city of Macomb, Illinois pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his "liberty" interest to be free from criminal prosecution absent probable cause had been violated. 8 2 The district court, in an unreported opinion, granted respondent's motion to dismiss on the theory that the complaint did not state a claim under § 1983.83 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this decision while concluding that petitioner filed his suit as malicious prosecution because the statute of limitations had passed for his false arrest claim. 84 Although the court acknowledged that malicious prosecution can be a component of a constitutional tort, it held that prosecution without probable cause could only be actionable under § 1983 when accompanied by incarceration, loss of employment, or other "palpable consequence." 8 5 Furthermore, the court rejected petitioner's argument that his "confinement" to Illinois deprived him of his constitutional "liberty," noting that Detective Oliver's testimony at the preliminary hearing was not intended to curtail petitioner's right to travel. 8 6 Finally, the court of appeals rejected petitioner's argument that he was denied the equal protection of the laws because the state's arbitrary act of selecting petitioner for prosecution did not create a "class" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. 87 83 Id. at 811. The court "also held that Detective Oliver was entitled to a defense of qualified immunity, and that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability against the city of Macomb. The District Court also dismissed without prejudice the common-law claim of malicious prosecution against Detective Oliver. These issues are not before this Court." Id. at 811 n.3. 84 
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided an individual the right to be free from criminal prosecution without probable cause. 90 In a seven-two decision, the four Justice plurality held that petitioner's claim could not be maintained under the Due Process Clause and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to dismiss petitioner's claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 91
A.
PLURALITY OPINION
In an opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the plurality 92 held that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "substantive due process, with its 'scarce and open-ended guideposts'" could not provide a basis for petitioner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. 9 3 The plurality, acknowledging its reluctance to expand the concept of substantive due process, maintained that it must analyze petitioner's claim under the Fourth Amendment, because the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to cover pretrial deprivations of liberty.
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Since the petitioner did not present the Fourth Amendment issue in his petition for certiorari, the plurality dismissed petitioner's claim without expressing an opinion as to whether petitioner would succeed under the Fourth Amendment. 95 The plurality began its analysis of petitioner's claim by declaring that to succeed in a § 1983 claim, the petitioner must first identify the specific constitutional provision allegedly infringed by the State. 96 Applying this requirement to petitioner's claim, the plurality maintained that petitioner's action alleged that respondent infringed his "substantive due process right to be free of prosecution without probable cause." 9 7 The plurality noted that petitioner Albright did not allege that Illinois denied him procedural due process, or violated his Fourth Amendment Rights, despite the plurality's recognition that "his surrender to the State's show of authority constituted a seizure for [-Vol. 85 the purposes of the Fourth Amendment." 9 8 Analyzing petitioner's claim in this rubric, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that petitioner's claim to be free from criminal prosecution absent probable cause was "markedly different" from the Court's past protections of substantive due process, which have mostly related to "marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity." 9 9 The plurality stated that "'[a]s a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.'" 1 0 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist then rejected petitioner's reliance upon prior Supreme Court cases that recognized the Fourteenth Amendment confers both substantive and procedural rights as the basis for a § 1983 claim. 10 1 While conceding that the Due Process Clause protects substantive rights intended to secure individuals from the arbitrary exercise of government power, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Constitution demanded more inquiry in a criminal prosecution than simply whether, in the Court's view, "the governmental action in question was 'arbitrary.'' "'more generalized notion of 'substantive due process'... ' [w]here a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection. '"107 Applying this test to petitioner's claim, the plurality determined that the Framers intended pretrial deprivations of liberty to be adjudicated under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 8 It noted that the Fourth Amendment relates to "deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions." 10 9 Therefore, the plurality held that petitioner's claim came under the Fourth Amendment, not under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 110 Finally, since petitioner did not present the Fourth Amendment question in his petition for certiorari, the plurality affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissing petitioner's claim."' B.
JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality's dismissal of petitioner's claim and argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could not supplement specific textual provisions of the Constitution.
112
Justice Scalia asserted that while there may be many different abuses of the trial process, petitioner's "deprivation of life, liberty, or property, if any, consisted of [his] pretrial arrest."" u 3 He then maintained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees merely that certain procedures are followed as a prerequisite to a deprivation of liberty. 114 While he recognized that the Court's current jurisprudence acknowledges substantive due process within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, he argued that "it cannot be used to impose additional requirements upon such of the states' criminal processes as are already addressed... by the Bill of Rights." 115 Since the Bill of Rights contains procedural guarantees within the Fifth and Sixth Amendments governing the period before and during trial, Justice Scalia concluded that those requirements could not be supplemented through utilization of the device the Court has referred to as "substantive due process." 1 16
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the plurality that petitioner's claim is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, but, unlike the plurality, proceeded to perform that analysis.' 1 7 After speculating as to why petitioner pressed a Fourteenth Amendment argument to the Court and not one based on the Fourth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg ultimately concluded that petitioner had a valid § 1983 claim based upon violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, but found that his failure to assert this claim to the Court barred any relief." 8 Initially, Justice Ginsburg stated that petitioner's "submission to arrest unquestionably constituted a [Fourth Amendment] seizure."" i 9 However, after acknowledging that petitioner advanced only a Fourteenth Amendment "substantive due process right to be free from prosecution without probable cause," Justice Ginsburg speculated that petitioner's "strategic decision appear[ed] to have been predicated on two doubtful assumptions, the first relating to the compass of the Fourth Amendment, the second, to the time for commencing this civil action."120 First, Justice Ginsburg argued that petitioner may have anticipated a holding limiting his "seizure" to the period from his surrender until he was released on bond, and thus Detective Oliver's allegedly misleading testimony could not be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. 12 1 Responding to this concern, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the common-law meaning of the Amendment's term "seizure" held it "to continue even after release from official custody." 122 Since the common law purpose of an arrest was to ensure an appearance in court, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the distinction between pretrial incarceration and bail is a "distinction between methods of retaining control over a defendant's person, not one between seizure and its opposite." 123 Thus, according to Justice Ginsburg, petitioner was "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment despite his re- 116 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
117 Id. at 814-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also id. at 813 (plurality declines to address petitioner's claim under the Fourth Amendment).
118 Id. at 814-17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 119 Id. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 120 Id. at 815 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 121 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 122 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 123 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Justice Ginsburg then buttressed her argument that petitioner was "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment with an argument based upon "common sense and common understanding."1 25 When facing criminal charges, a person must appear in court at the state's command, is often restricted from travelling outside the state without leave of court, and must prepare a defense at great financial and emotional expense.1 26 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that an alleged wrongdoer incarcerated until trial undoubtably suffers greater burdens, but argued that the difference "should not lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pretrial is not still 'seized' in the constitutionally relevant sense." 12 7 Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that Detective Oliver's allegedly misleading testimony at the preliminary hearing perpetuated the state's "seizure" of petitioner. 12 After concluding that petitioner was "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg addressed whether the statute of limitations would have barred petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim. 129 She asserted that the statute of limitations should have accrued upon the dismissal of the lawsuit against petitioner, not at the date of his arrest, as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested in dictum.' 5 0 Because petitioner remained "seized" until dismissal of the charges against him, his cause of action accrued at the end of the criminal proceedings, rather than at the time of his arrest. 131 As a result, she concluded that petitioner could have asserted a Fourth Amendment claim within the statute of limitations. 132 Finally, although petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim was "neither substantively deficient nor inevitably time-barred," 13 Justice Ginsburg concluded that petitioner's abandonment of the claim in the district court and failure to reassert it in front of the Supreme Court barred the Court from asserting it for him.' a4 Thus, she concurred with the plurality decision dismissing petitioner's complaint. 135 124 Id. at 815-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 125 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
D. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy 36 also agreed with the plurality that "an allegation of arrest without probable cause must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment." 3 7 However, he wrote separately to explain that petitioner's due process claim arose not out of his arrest by Detective Oliver, but out of an allegedly malicious criminal prosecution against him.' 38 Therefore, Justice Kennedy analyzed the criminal proceedings, not the arrest, under the Due Process Clause, and ultimately concluded that the existence of a state tort remedy in Illinois for malicious prosecution disposed of petitioner's claim.' 3 9
The threshold question forJustice Kennedy was "whether the due process requirements for criminal proceedings include a standard for the initiation of a prosecution." 14 0 Justice Kennedy argued that the Bill of Rights imposes no standard for the initiation of a prosecution, nor does it require a pretrial hearing. 14 ' While he conceded that a criminal procedure may violate the Due Process Clause even if it does not violate a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, he argued that while the "common law provided for a grand jury indictment and a speedy trial [,] it did not provide a specific evidentiary standard applicable to a pretrial hearing on the merits of the charges." 142 Since the Bill of Rights guarantees these traditional requirements of the criminal process, any standard that governed the initiation of a criminal proceeding would be superfluous to the Constitutional protections governing the criminal process. 43 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the due process inquiry does not end there.'4 For purposes of petitioner's claim, he assumed arguendo that the Due Process Clause protected petitioner's interest in freedom from malicious prosecution. 4 Justice Souter first argued that the Court had previously rejected the proposition that a specific constitutional provision can preempt the application of a more general one and denied that "incorporation of the substantive guarantees of the first eight amendments to the Constitution defines the [outer] limits of due process protection." 59 Nevertheless, Justice Souter felt that the Court had to exercise judicial self-restraint when asked to expand the protections of substantive due process, and contended that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be used to duplicate protections adequately addressed by other constitutional provisions.
60
Applying judicial self-restraint to petitioner's claim, Justice Souter declared that it failed to allege any injury which resulted from the initiation of a baseless prosecution against petitioner that did not also result from his seizure by the State, correctly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. 16 ' As such, "[n]one of these injuries . . .is alleged to have followed from the issuance of the formal instrument of prosecution, as distinct from the ensuing assertion of custody."' 6 2 Therefore, he concluded, the petitioner failed to show a substantive deprivation of liberty attributable to the initiation of the prosecution.' 63 The significance of petitioner's failure, Justice Souter asserted, lies in the courts of appeals' recognition that injuries similar to petitioner's have provided a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause, not the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. x64 Since damages to reputation, limitation on movement, burden of defending, and other attendant harms tend to occur after arrest, Justice Souter concluded "it is not surprising that rules of recovery for such harms have naturally coalesced under the Fourth Amendment." 65 Finally, Justice Souter recognized the potential for an injury to occur during the interim period between the filing of a groundless criminal charge and a Fourth Amendment seizure, but remarked that this was not petitioner's claim.' 6 6 Therefore,Justice Souter concluded that the Court should exercise judicial self-restraint and concurred in the plurality's opinion dismissing petitioner's claim. 70 Justice Stevens argued that states are also required to adequately protect the probable cause requirement for initiation of a criminal prosecution.1 7 1 Applying the facts of petitioner's claim, he contended that the state did not satisfy the probable cause requirement in this case. 1 72 Next, he asserted that the state's failure to meet the probable cause requirement violated petitioner's "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment and that "compliance with certain procedural formalities which ordinarily ensure that a prosecution will not commence absent probable cause" does not meet the demands of the Due Process Clause.'73 Therefore, he dissented from the decision of the plurality dismissing petitioner's claim. 174 Initially, Justice Stevens declared that Hurtado v. Califomia, 175 while not requiring states to initiate a prosecution by grand jury indictment, mandates that states adequately protect the probable cause requirement for initiation of a criminal prosecution. 17 6 After factually analyzing petitioner's claim, he concluded that the probable cause requirement was not satisfied in this case. 177 Following this factual analysis, Justice Stevens declared that the Due Process Clause is unquestionably implicated where an individual is convicted and incarcerated, 78 but "extend[s] well beyond freedom from an improper criminal conviction." 179 He noted that the parameters of the Due Process Clause have never been fully defined, and that formal commencement of a criminal proceeding violates "a range of identified liberty interests ... of sufficient magnitude to qualify as a deprivation of liberty meriting constitutional protection" by the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 0 Therefore, he concluded, the Court should have continued its analysis to determine "what measure of 'due process' must be provided an accused in connection with this deprivation of liberty."' 8 '
Justice Stevens relied on various precedents to discern that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands a responsible decision whether there is probable cause to prosecute an individual for a criminal violation. 18 2 Analyzing this requirement of "probable cause to prosecute," he rejected an approach where "a state's compliance with facially valid procedures for initiating a prosecution [would be] by itself sufficient to meet the demands of due process, without regard to the substance of the resulting probable cause determination." 1 8 3 He argued that it is "well established that adherence to procedural forms will not save a conviction that rests in substance on false evidence or deliberate deception." 1 8 4 Analogizing the initiation of a criminal prosecution to such a conviction, he concluded that compliance with facially valid procedures for the initiation of a prosecution would not, by itself, meet the demands of the Due Process Clause. 1 ' Finally, Justice Stevens commented upon the various opinions that supported the Court's judgment. 186 Beginning with the plurality opinion, he identified two "glaring flaws." 1 8 7 First, he asserted that petitioner's pretrial deprivation of liberty is addressed specifically by the Fifth, not the Fourth, Amendment. 188 While acknowledging that this is of lesser importance, he contended that "the cramped view of the Fourteenth Amendment taken by the plurality today has been rejected time and time again by the Court." 189 He argued that the Due Process Clause recognizes liberty interests not "limited to the realm outside [of the] criminal law." 190 Second, Justice Stevens maintained that the plurality virtually ignored the principle that "'the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 19 1 Relying on this assertion, he faulted the plurality for attempting to limit the Due Process Clause by the specific guarantees within the Bill of Rights.
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Justice Stevens began his comments on justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion by acknowledging his agreement with her contention that petitioner could have alleged a cause of action under § 1983 based on the Fourth Amendment. 93 However, he asserted that petitioner's "abandonment of a claim based on the seizure should [not] constitute a waiver of the claim based on the [allegedly malicious] accusation," 1 9 4 because the Fourth Amendment protection "does not fully encompass the liberty interest that is at stake."' 9 5 Therefore, he concluded that Justice Ginsburg's opinion does not adequately explain her conclusion that the complaint should be dismissed.'
Justice Stevens next faulted Justice Souter's concurrence for wrongly characterizing petitioner's claim "as an invitation to enter uncharted territory" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
19 7 Citing various precedents, he concluded that the claim is "manifestly of constitutional dimension."
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Justice Stevens also argued that Justice Kennedy's concurrence incorrectly relied upon Parratt v. Taylor' 9 9 to dispose of petitioner's claim. 2 00 He contended that the Parratt rule was inapplicable to this case, because it "is limited to situations in which no constitutional violation occurs." 2 01 Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that in cases such as petitioner's, in which there is an alleged constitutional violation, § 1983 provides a federal remedy regardless of the presence of an adequate state remedy. The Court set a standard that future potential plaintiffs allege a specific constitutional violation as a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution, rather than rely on the "'more generalized notion of substantive due process"' as the basis for their claim. Despite this, the Court has consistently recognized a general reluctance to expand the notions of substantive due process analysis. 2 1 5 The Court has previously found substantive rights pertaining to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education." 2 1 6 None of these cases, however, presented issues pertaining to an alleged abuse of the legal process, such as the tort of malicious prosecution. Cases involving abuse of the legal process have typically been adjudicated pursuant to "the procedural protections Since Hurtado, the Court has had the opportunity to refine the procedures constitutionally due a potential defendant under the Fourteenth Amendment. Consistently applying specific provisions of the Bill of Rights pertaining to criminal proceedings to the States, the Court has declined to recognize broad substantive due process rights within the context of those proceedings. 22 5 Given the past application of these processes to the States, the plurality was correct to conclude that " [ w] here a particular amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims."' 2 26 To conclude otherwise would subject every procedural safeguard within the Bill of Rights to substantive review. This would transform the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause into an "allencompassing" provision, and subject each and every procedural protection within the Bill of Rights to substantive due process review, hardly the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, it would render the procedural safeguards within the Bill of Rights superfluous, as each provision would ultimately be evaluated under substantive due process review.
Most recently, the Court has required constitutional claims to be adjudicated under a specific constitutional provision rather than under the "more generalized notion of 'substantive due process, ' 235 Although Graham applied specifically to the use of excessive force during a seizure, 236 the analysis is applicable to petitioner's claim as well, because the Framers intended pretrial deprivations of liberty to be adjudicated under the Fourth Amendment.
specifically governs "pretrial deprivations of liberty" 238 failed to recognize that procedural due process is implicated by a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution. 2 39 Hurtado recognized over 100 years ago that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to operate "according to the settled course of judicial proceedings," 2 40 and, applying a procedural due process analysis, the Court more recently "rejected the notion that all of the required incidents of a fundamentally fair trial were to be found in the provisions of the Bill of Rights." 2 41
Therefore, while the plurality correctly concluded that the application of the Fourth Amendment to petitioner's claim precludes substantive due process review, it does not follow that application of the Fourth Amendment to a § 1983 claim predicated on malicious prosecution should also preclude due process analysis.
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Furthermore, the plurality noted that " [ 242 To be sure, the plurality does not hold that procedural due process is not violated by a § 1983 claim based upon malicious prosecution, but merely fails to recognize that it may be implicated in addition to the Fourth Amendment. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813-14. See also Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Albrightwould appear virtually to foreclose reliance on substantive due process as the basis for a viable malicious prosecution claim under section 1983") (emphasis added). Before Justice Ginsburg could analyze petitioner's claim under the Fourth Amendment, 249 it was necessary to establish that petitioner was "seized." There is no debate that an arrest of an individual by the State is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. 250 
CLAIM
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court must determine if the police officer's seizure of petitioner pursuant to the evidence available to him was "objectively reasonable." 256 Under this standard, an officer violates the Fourth Amendment if the Court determines that the officer had "no reasonable grounds" for believing that a seizure was legal. Applying this standard to particular cases, the Court has announced that "searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness." 25 8 An issued warrant becomes prima facie evidence that an investigating officer acted reasonably in conducting a search or seizure; "[o]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more that the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law." 259 Therefore, "a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish" that an investigating officer has "acted in good faith in conducting the search." 2 60 Pursuant to this analysis, the Court has declared "that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fail." 2 61
Nevertheless, a warrant may be invalidated (and thus the seizure unconstitutional) because it was later determined that the information upon which the magistrate issued the warrant fell short of probable cause. 2 62 A neutral magistrate's finding of probable cause, implicit in the issuance of a search or arrest warrant, "does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which the determination was based." 2 63 Therefore, when an arrest warrant has been issued, the standard of "objective reasonableness" requires that an individual show "knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit" before the seizure will be declared invalid, and the individ-
